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1. Introduction 
 
The coverage and depth of preferential treatment varies from one regional trade 
agreement (RTA) to another. Modern RTAs, and not exclusively those linking the most 
developed economies, tend to go far beyond tariff-cutting exercises. They provide for 
increasingly complex regulations governing intra-trade (e.g. with respect to standards, 
safeguard provisions, customs administration, etc.) and they often also provide for a 
preferential regulatory framework for mutual services trade. The most sophisticated 
RTAs go beyond traditional trade policy mechanisms, to include regional rules on 
investment, competition, environment and labour.   
World Trade Organization (WTO) website 
 
The scope of recent RTAs is becoming much wider. RTAs had been traditionally 
taken as a means to mainly reduce tariff rates. While their elimination is still the major 
purpose of RTAs, recently-concluded RTAs include various provisions on mobility of 
persons, government procurement, competition policy, intellectual property, 
E-commerce, dispute settlement, labor standards, environmental policy, technical 
cooperation, institutional mechanism, and so on. The coverage and depth of these 
provisions go beyond those in the WTO agreements such as the Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA) or the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). For example, with the provision on government 
procurement, RTAs can lead to lower trade barriers in government procurement in 
developing (and some developed) countries that did not sign the GPA. Also, the 
provision on government procurement in RTAs can require lower monetary thresholds 
for contracts than the case of GPA. In turn, such “extended RTAs” not only reduce tariff 
rates but also enhance the cooperation and linkage in various economic fields among 
member countries. 
In this paper, we empirically examine how far advanced, non-conventional 
provisions in RTAs increase trade values among RTA member countries. There are 
significant varieties among RTAs on which provision the RTA includes. For example, 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, South Asian Free Trade Area agreement, 
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Australia-Chile Free Trade agreement, and Economic Cooperation Organisation Trade 
Agreement do not include a provision on government procurement, that of intellectual 
property, that of competition policy, and that of dispute settlement, respectively. In 
contrast, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) incorporates all of these four 
provisions. As a result, if the existence of each provision has significant trade creation 
effects, such differences in RTAs’ scope can lead to heterogeneous impacts on trade 
among RTAs, even though the magnitude of tariff reduction is identical among RTAs. In 
short, our analysis will contribute to detecting heterogeneous impacts of RTAs as well 
as to clarifying which provision matters in terms of the magnitude of trade creation 
effects. The results from our analysis can be useful in designing an RTA that would 
maximize the trade creation effects. 
In order to assesssuch heterogeneous impacts of RTAs, we estimate the 
well-known gravity equation. In the literature of RTA evaluation, several studies have 
estimated the gravity equation with RTA dummy variables (e.g. Baier and Bergstrand, 
2007; Caporale et al., 2009; Medvedev, 2010; Vicard, 2009). The typical dummy 
variable is the one taking unity if trading countries belong to the same RTA and zero 
otherwise. We decompose this simple one-zero RTA dummy into five variables. Among 
these five variables, one is applied bilateral tariff rates in order to capture the primary 
trade creation effects, i.e. the effects of tariff reduction. The rest of the variables are 
dummy variables indicating the existence of various non-conventional provisions in 
RTAs, namely government procurement, competition policy, intellectual property, and 
dispute settlement. For example, the government procurement dummy takes unity if the 
concerned RTA includes the provision on government procurement and zero otherwise. 
Other dummy variables are similarly defined. These four provisions are chosen because 
of the relative ease in identifying them in the agreements.1 We investigate whether the 
coefficient for each of those variables in the gravity equation is estimated to be 
significantly positive or not. 
Our decomposition of trade creation effects of RTAs contributes to the 
above-mentioned literature of RTA evaluation by gravity equations. In particular, our 
paper may be closest to Vicard (2009). He decomposes the simple one-zero RTA 
                                                 
1 The existence of non-conventional provisions such as investment chapter is not examined in this 
paper because the depth of those provisions varies wildly among RTAs. 
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dummy variable according to the form/type of RTA, i.e., into four dummy variables of 
preferential arrangements, free trade agreements, customs unions and common markets. 
The assumption underlying in his analysis is that the coverage of RTAs is different 
among RTA types. For example, the preferential arrangement is expected to have the 
least coverage. Contrary to this expectation, his finding is that the magnitude of trade 
creation effects is not significantly different among those RTA types. Against his paper, 
as mentioned above, we decompose the simple RTA dummy according to specific 
functions of RTA. In other words, this paper explicitly measures the depth of RTAs by 
identifying several functions of RTA individually and examines the relationship between 
each function and its trade creation effects. Such an analysis will be a more direct and 
appropriate analysis on the relationship between the depth of RTAs and their trade 
creation effects. 
In this paper, we also examine trade creation effects in more detail, by 
differentiating them into so-called “intensive margin” and “extensive margin”. Recently, 
the literature has investigated changes in trade values by decomposing those into 
changes in the number of varieties traded (extensive margin) and changes in trade 
values per variety (intensive margin). Some studies point to the importance of the 
extensive margin while others, the intensive margin. So far, the existing literature has 
produced mixed results. For example, Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) find that from 
1950 to 1997, 40% of world trade growth came from extensive margin. Also, Debaere 
and Mostashari (2010) examine the changes in the impact of tariff reduction on 
extensive margin and find small effects of tariff reductions on extensive margin, relative 
to the overall growth in international trade. On the other hand, Liu (2009) finds that 
GATT/WTO has promoted trade in not only extensive margin but also intensive margin. 
In order to reach some conclusions, we need to further examine closely the changes of 
intensive and extensive margins. 
Also in our context, it is important to examine the impacts of the 
above-mentioned provisions in RTAs on the extensive and intensive margins. To our 
best knowledge, few papers have investigated the impacts of RTAs on those margins. In 
particular, no studies have explored the impacts of the provisions in RTAs on those 
margins. In contrast, it is invaluable for policymakers to know whether RTAs increase 
more greatly the intensive margin or the extensive margin. If the trade creation effects 
5 
 
are mainly realized through intensive margin, then the political support for RTAs will be 
limited to firms and industries that are already trading. Contrary to this case, if those 
effects come mainly from extensive margin, then the political support can be broader to 
include those firms and industries that are currently not exporting but potentially can. As 
a result, if each provision on RTAs affects intensive margin and extensive margin 
differently, it may be possible to design RTAs so as to not only maximize the increase of 
trade values but also broaden the political support for the conclusion of RTAs. In short, 
our analysis can potentially derive an important implication from the political point of 
view. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section takes an overview 
of RTAs according to their coverage of provisions. Section 3 specifies our empirical 
framework to examine the impacts of those provisions on trade values, i.e. gravity 
equations. Their estimation results are reported in Section 4. We also examine the 
impacts of those provisions on the intensive and extensive margins separately. Lastly, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Heterogeneous Regional Trade Agreements 
    Each RTA includes many provisions in different combinations. For example, as 
listed in Table 1, NAFTA has 22 chapters. In this paper, we focus on the role of four 
kinds of provisions in RTAs because those are relatively easy to be identified in the 
agreements; government procurement, intellectual property, competition policy, and 
dispute settlement. Taking the case of NAFTA as an example, we first take a brief look 
at the content of each provision.  
 
===   Table 1   === 
 
     The provision on government procurement lowers trade barriers in government 
procurement through better transparency in awarding contracts, information access, 
market access, and national treatment. The monetary thresholds for contracts are also 
often lowered to make public procurement a more contestable market. In the case of 
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NAFTA, Chapter 10 establishes the clause on government procurement. It requires each 
country to accord national treatment and non-discrimination in its procuring goods and 
services including construction services to federal government entities, government 
enterprises, and state and provincial government entities in other member countries. 
Such entities are explicitly set out in Annexes of the agreement. Also, the value of the 
awarded contract for those goods and services must be equal to or greater than a certain 
threshold, which is calculated and adjusted according to the U.S. inflation rate. This 
chapter is also important in the sense that Mexico, which does not sign the GPA, 
accords. As a result, the provision on government procurement gives foreign firms the 
access to government procurement market, which typically accounts for more than ten 
percent of GDP, resulting in increasing trade among member countries in this 
economically important and often highly protected market. 
     The provision on intellectual property includes the implementation of high 
protection of intellectual property required, or an agreement to forgo transition periods 
and privileges that developing countries and countries in economic transition negotiated 
during and after the Uruguay Round of GATT. In the case of NAFTA, Chapter 17 
establishes intellectual property. Article 1701 prescribes that each country shall provide 
in its territory to the nationals of other member countries, adequate and effective 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. Furthermore, it requires 
member countries to give effect to the provisions of several conventions such as the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. This chapter also includes the 
protection of encrypted program carrying satellite signals, which is not included in 
TRIPS. As a result, the provision on intellectual property plays a role of strengthening 
its protection beyond that required by the WTO TRIPS Agreement and thus plays a role 
of increasing trade particularly of goods incorporating high technology among member 
countries. 
     The competition policy chapter contains commitments to ensure that 
anticompetitive business practices are proscribed, monopolies do not abuse their powers, 
there are avenues for complaints of unfair practices to be initiated, and the relevant 
authorities commit to cooperate and consult one another to facilitate enforcement. 
Chapter 15 in NAFTA establishes competition policy. It requires member countries to 
adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anticompetitive business conducts and to take 
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appropriate actions with respect thereto (Article 1501). FTA members are to consult and 
cooperate on the effectiveness of their national competition laws and to cooperate on the 
enforcement of those laws via mutual legal assistance, notification, consultation, and the 
exchange of information. In turn, the provision on competition policy contributes to 
minimizing the distortion of trade creation effects through the existence of 
anticompetitive policy. 
     The provision on dispute settlement requires consultations, makes available good 
offices, mediation, and conciliation, and provides for some form of arbitration if 
consultations are unsuccessful.2 In the case of NAFTA, Chapter 20 establishes dispute 
settlement. NAFTA members are required to try to resolve Chapter 20 disputes through 
government-to-government consultations. If consultations are unsuccessful, the 
countries may request a meeting of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (comprising of 
the trade ministers of the member countries). If the commission cannot resolve the 
dispute, a country may call for an establishment of a five-member arbitral panel, which 
is entitled to seek assistance from scientific experts. NAFTA permits countries to choose 
whether to resolve trade disputes through arbitration within NAFTA or before the WTO. 
As a result, with the provision on dispute settlement, firms’ risk of causing diplomatic 
embarrassment becomes low, and thus firms do not need to become atrophic in 
expanding their trade. 
     Next, we take a look over these provisions not only in NAFTA but also in other 
RTAs. To do that, we employ the Asia - Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements 
Database provided by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific (ESCAP). This database provides detailed descriptive and updated 
information on the provision of RTAs applicable to the ESCAP region. The latest 
available version of the database covers all the agreements reported to the WTO in 
which at least one party is in the ESCAP region. It also includes other agreements that 
have not been notified but for which there is official information readily available. For 
some RTAs, we also incorporate the data from the Free Trade Agreement Database for 
Asia provided by the Asia Regional Integration Center, the Asian Development Bank. 
As a result, we can examine 111 RTAs in the ESCAP region, which entered into force 
                                                 
2 For more details, see Asian Development Bank (2008). 
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by 2009 (see Appendix A). Figure 1 depicts the change of the number of RTAs in the 
ESCAP region, showing the dramatic rise from around 40 in 2000 to above 100 in 2009. 
 
===   Figure 1   === 
 
     Table 2 shows the existence of each provision in our sample of RTAs. In the 
upper area of this table, we can see that all RTAs do not necessarily include all of the 
four provisions of our interests. While more than a half of the sample RTAs includes the 
provision on dispute settlement, the provisions on government procurement, 
competition policy, and intellectual property are less likely to be included (less than 
50%). This may indicate that dispute settlement mechanism is perceived to be more 
essential in maximizing the trade creation effects of RTAs. Moreover, only 36% of 
RTAs include the government procurement provision. Given the fact that the 
government procurement issue was removed from the Doha agenda in 2004, its 
inclusion may be relatively difficult also in the negotiation for concluding RTAs. 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
     The lower area of the table lists more detailed descriptions on the provisions. 
From this area, we can see that a half of RTAs are either those with all provisions (24%) 
or those without any provisions (27%). That is, there are still a significant number of 
RTAs that do not have any provisions. The rest of RTAs are widely different in terms of 
the coverage of provisions. The case with the relatively large share is the RTAs with 
only the provision on dispute settlement (15%). Thus, again we may say that dispute 
settlement mechanism is a relatively essential provision in RTAs. In addition, we can 
see that there are no RTAs that include only the provision on government procurement. 
This may also again indicate its difficulty in including this particular provision in RTAs. 
In other words, RTAs with the provision on government procurement are likely to 
include the other provisions. This wide variety of RTAs in terms of the depth and 
coverage has been the missing factor in the literature, leading to mixed results. By 
differentiating these provisions, our aim is to estimate the trade creation effects more 
precisely and to identify which provisions are more effective. 
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3. Empirical Framework 
     In this section, we first provide our empirical specification to examine the 
heterogeneous impacts of RTAs. After briefly introducing the traditional gravity 
equation, we present our extended gravity equation. Then we also discuss some 
empirical issues on the estimation of gravity equation for RTA evaluation, in addition to 
presenting our data sources. 
 
3.1. Gravity Equation 
In international economics, it is well known that a gravity equation is one of the 
most successful tools for quantitatively analyzing bilateral merchandise trade patterns. 
The gravity equation in international trade is formalized as follows: 
ln Tij = β0 + Xi β1+Xj β2+ tij β3+ εij. 
where Tij represents bilateral goods exports of country i to country j. Xi and Xj are a 
vector of exporter-specific elements and a vector of importer-specific elements, 
respectively. tij is a vector of pair-specific elements. ε is a disturbance term. The 
traditional gravity equation has logs of importer’s and exporter’s GDPs as an 
importer-specific element and an exporter-specific element, respectively, and a log of 
distance between trading partners as a pair-specific element. Its estimation result always 
presents us with an excellent empirical fit. Relying on such properties, a large number 
of scholars have employed the gravity equation for the investigation of bilateral trade. 
The recent issue in the gravity equation is the control for so-called “multilateral 
resistance terms”. Under the usual assumptions in horizontal differentiation models 
based on the CES utility function, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive the gravity 
equation including exporter’s and importer’s price indices, which are called 
“multilateral resistance” terms. As is known as an omitted-variable bias, the exclusion 
of the multilateral resistance terms from the gravity equation makes its OLS estimates 
biased. The most common way of controlling those terms, which is proposed by 
Feenstra (2002), is the inclusion of importer and exporter fixed effects (ui and uj) into 
the gravity equation as the following: 
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ln Tij = tij β3+ ui + uj + εij. 
Their inclusion forces us to drop exporter-specific elements and importer-specific 
elements due to the perfect multicolinearity. 
     In the literature, several variables are introduced as pair-specific elements. In 
addition to the geographical distance, three dummy variables are commonly introduced: 
ln Tij = β1 ln Distanceij + β2 Contingencyij  
+ β3 Languageij + β4 Colonyij + β5 RTAij + ui + uj + εij. 
Contingency takes unity if two countries share the national border and zero otherwise. 
Language is a dummy variable taking unity if a common language is spoken by at least 
9% of the population in both countries and zero otherwise. Colony is a binary variable 
indicating whether the two countries have had a colonial relationship. For the evaluation 
of RTAs, the simple RTA dummy is often included, which takes unity if two countries 
are the members of the same RTA and zero otherwise. This equation is also our baseline 
equation to be estimated. 
     We decompose this RTA variable into five variables to analyze more precisely the 
impacts of RTA on trade values. Specifically, our extended gravity equation is given by: 
ln Tij = β1 ln Distanceij + β2 Contingencyij + β3 Languageij + β4 Colonyij  
+ β6 ln (1+Tariffij) + β7 Governmentij + β8 Competitionij + β9 Intellectualij + β10 Disputeij 
+ ui + uj + εij. 
Tariffij indicates the applied tariff rates of country j on goods from country i. This 
variable captures the main role of RTAs, namely, tariff reduction. Government, 
Competition, Intellectual, and Dispute are dummy variables taking unity if two 
countries conclude on an RTA which includes the provisions on government 
procurement, competition policy, intellectual property, and dispute settlement, 
respectively. Unless two countries share the same RTA, these variables are set equal to 
zero. By estimating this equation, we investigate whether or not each provision 
contributes to boosting bilateral trade in addition to the impacts of tariff reduction. 
 
3.2. Empirical Issues 
     We estimate these equations for manufacturing trade among 73 countries in year 
2009, of which list is provided in Appendix B. The data on trade values are obtained 
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from the UN Comtrade. We aggregate the HS1992 6-digit level trade values into the 
single trade values of manufacturing industry (Sectors 2 to 4 in CPC provisional 
classification3) using the conversion table between CPC provisional classification and 
HS1992 available in the website of United Nations Statistical Division (UNSD).4 The 
source of Distance, Contingency, Language, and Colony is the Centre d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII) website. The information on RTAs is derived from the same 
source as in Section 2. 
Our data source for tariff rates for manufacturing trade comes from the World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)5, which is now the most powerful software on tariff 
rates developed by the World Bank, UNCTAD, International Trade Center (ITC), 
UNSD, and WTO. In addition, some other sources are used for identifying exact tariff 
schemes for each trading partner.6 In particular, we need to construct a list of member 
countries for WTO and each RTA. Also, the GSP beneficiaries are different across 
importers. The information on WTO and RTA are obtained from the WTO website. We 
use “The Regional Trade Agreements Information System” for obtaining the member 
list of RTA.7 As for the GSP beneficiaries, we used several documents available in the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website 8  in 
addition to official documents in the website of national customs in each country. We 
treat non-ad valorem tariff rates simply as missing. Also, for simplicity, we use the 
lower rates for mix tariff rates, though these treatments underestimate tariff rates to 
some extent. However, our focus on manufacturing industry obviously decreases the 
magnitude of these kinds of underestimation because non-ad valorem tariff rates and 
mix tariff rates are mostly applied in non-manufacturing industries. 
We estimate the above gravity equations with the pseudo poisson maximum 
likelihood (PPML). In the literature, zero-valued trade is also becoming a major issue. 
                                                 
3 Sector 2 is food products, beverages and tobacco; textiles, apparel and leather products; Section 3 
is other transportable goods, except metal products, machinery and equipment; Sector 4 Metal 
products, machinery and equipment. 
4 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regdnld.asp?Lg=1 
5 http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/ 
6 We assume that all firms use the tariff schemes with the lowest rates though some firms may be 
forced to use the higher general tariff rates such as MFN rates because it is necessary to incur some 
kinds of fixed costs for the use of preferential tariff schemes (Demidova and Krishna, 2008). 
7 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx 
8 http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1418&lang=1 
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As Melitz (2003) suggests, the trade values can be systematically zero. However, taking 
logarithms drops such observations from the sample because zero trade is undefined in 
gravity equation. Since there is a systematic reason for zero trade, dropping 
observations with zero trade leads to our getting rid of potentially useful information 
and to yielding the sample selection bias. In order to naturally include zero trade in our 
sample, we employ the PPML estimation technique proposed by Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006). It enables us to estimate a gravity model which includes zero trades because the 
dependent variable is not log of trade but the actual trade value. Furthermore, since the 
independent variables enter in logs, their coefficients can be still interpreted as 
elasticities.9 
Last, it is worth noting endogeneity issues on RTA-related variables. In the 
literature, there is no doubt that one-zero RTA dummy is not an exogenous random 
variable: countries decide systematically whether they conclude an RTA or not. 
Furthermore, the elements having influence on international trade between them also 
affect the decision on the RTA conclusion (see, for example, Baier and Bergstrand, 
2004). Hence, one-zero RTA dummy is possibly correlated with the disturbance term. 
Without accounting for the endogeneity on the RTA dummy, the estimation of gravity 
equation with the one-zero RTA dummy by OLS results in yielding biases in the 
estimates. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) examine closely the endogeneity issue in the 
RTA dummy. As a result, they demonstrate that the most plausible estimates of the RTA 
impacts on international trade are obtained from the gravity estimation using panel data 
with bilateral fixed effects.  
However, our use of cross-sectional data does not allow us to account for this 
issue with the similar method as Baier and Bergstrand (2007). There are two reasons 
why we could not construct the panel data. The first is because our RTA dataset does not 
include RTAs ineffective before 2010. Ignoring such ineffective RTAs will yield biases 
                                                 
9 Another approach, which is proposed by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), takes such a 
systematic sample selection into account (HMR method). This is the extended technique of the 
Heckman two-step estimation. The first step estimation examines the probability that two countries 
have positive trade values, and the second step estimation restricts to country pairs with positive 
trade and then examines its magnitude taking the results of the first step estimation into account. 
While the PPML assumes that the zero trade does not have anything special in spite of its systematic 
reason, this HMR method succeeds in accounting for the zero trade issue with taking the selection 
mechanics of trade into account. We employ the modified version of this HMR method in Section 
4.2. 
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on our estimates. The second reason is because we do not know the year in which each 
provision is included in agreements. Although our database on RTAs includes the year 
of their entry into force, those provisions are sometimes included into agreements 
several years after RTAs’ entry into force. Again, ignoring the difference in entry year 
between RTAs and their provisions will give rise to biases on our estimates. In particular, 
these kinds of biases may be more serious than the endogeneity biases. Nevertheless, we 
may need to interpret our estimates under the cross-sectional data carefully. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
     In this section, we first present our estimation results on gravity equations 
specified in the previous section. Then, we examine the impacts of each provision in 
RTAs on the intensive margin and the extensive margin separately. 
 
4.1. Gravity Results on RTA Variables 
Our baseline result is reported in column (I) in Table 3. This equation includes the 
typical one-zero RTA dummy variable in most empirical studies. All coefficients have 
expected signs, though the coefficient for Colony is estimated to be insignificant. The 
geographical distance between trading partners is negatively correlated with trade 
values. The linguistic commonality and sharing of the national border encourage active 
trade between two countries. As is consistent with the findings in the previous studies, 
we obtain a significantly positive coefficient for the simple RTA dummy variable, 
indicating the positive trade creation effects. Specifically, RTAs increase bilateral trade 
by 23% (i.e. e0.206-1). 
 
===   Table 3   === 
 
We decompose this simple RTA dummy variable into five components. The result 
is reported in column (II). The results in the variables included in (I) are qualitatively 
unchanged. The variable of bilateral tariff rates has a significantly negative coefficient, 
as is consistent with our expectation. The results in four dummy variables on RTAs’ 
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provisions are not necessarily consistent with our expectation. The significantly positive 
coefficient can be found only in the variable for competition policy. The dummy 
variables for government procurement and intellectual property have insignificant 
coefficients. Furthermore, the provision on dispute settlement has significantly negative 
effects on the trade. However, these results might be due to high correlation among 
those variables, namely multi-collinearity. 
Next, we introduce four variables on RTAs’ provisions separately in order to 
avoid multi-collinearity in a simple way. All of their coefficients are estimated to be 
positive. The provision on competition policy has the largest impacts on trade values 
(74%). The similar magnitude of trade creation effects can be found in the dummy 
variable for government procurement. Its provision increases trade values by 63%. The 
coefficient for intellectual property provision dummy is also significantly positive, 
though its magnitude is relatively small (22%). Contrast to these variables, the provision 
on dispute settlement has an insignificant coefficient. This insignificant result may 
indicate that (at least except for a limited number of large companies) each company 
does not care about the risk of causing diplomatic embarrassment. 
We further control for one more variable, a WTO membership dummy variable. It 
takes unity if both of two countries are the member of WTO and zero otherwise. As 
mentioned before, the depth and coverage of provisions in the recent RTAs go beyond 
those in the WTO agreements. In order to confirm that these depth and coverage 
contributes to trade creation in addition to WTO effects, we examine the trade creation 
effects of each provision, while controlling for the WTO membership. The results are 
reported in Table 4. As is consistent with our expectation, the coefficients for WTO are 
estimated to be significantly positive, indicating that the WTO membership also 
contributes to increasing bilateral trade values (237%-411%). Importantly, the results in 
the above-introduced RTA dummy variables on provisions are qualitatively unchanged. 
Thus, our estimation reveals that the deeper provisions in RTAs than those in WTO 
agreements contribute significantly to trade creation. 
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
     Lastly, we also consider the lagged effects of each provision. The previous studies 
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using the simple one-zero RTA dummy variable examine the lagged effects of RTA, 
based on the fact that the actual implementation of an RTA involves a “phase-in” period, 
typically over five or ten years. For instance, NAFTA had 10-year phase-in period 
before its full implementation. The same kind of story could be obviously applied into 
our case. For example, each provision seems to take some time to work effectively. Its 
performance may get better through a kind of “learning-by-doing”. As a result, the 
entire effects of each provision on trade values cannot be fully captured in the 
concurrent year only. Therefore, we include five-year lagged dummy variables of 
provisions. The results are reported in Table 5. Interestingly, all of the coefficients for 
provision variables are estimated to be significantly positive. Furthermore, their 
magnitudes are larger than those in contemporaneous estimation. These results imply 
that some gestation period may be needed for the fuller effects of each provision on 
trade to be realized. 
 
===   Table 5   === 
 
4.2. Intensive Margin versus Extensive Margin 
     In the previous analysis, we found that each provision contributes to increasing 
trade values among member countries. In this section, we examine where such an 
increase of trade values comes from, the increase in the number of traded variety 
(extensive margin) or the increase in trade values per variety (intensive margin). 
Following Flam and Nordstrom (2011), we use the count of traded varieties (HS 6-digit 
level) as the measure of extensive margin. Total trade values divided by the count of 
traded varieties are used as the measure of intensive margin. 
Flam and Nordstrom (2011) modify the method proposed by Helpman, Melitz, 
and Rubinstein (2008) 10, which controls for firm level heterogeneity and sample 
selection on the intensive margin, by further controlling for the pervasive presence of 
heteroscedasticity in trade data. Their estimation strategy is the following. In the first 
stage, they estimate the gravity equation for the extensive margin of trade, under the 
addition of instrumental variables in order not to let the identification of the extensive 
                                                 
10 Also see footnote 9. 
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margin estimates depend solely on the normality assumption for unobserved trade costs. 
Then, the second stage estimates the gravity equation for the intensive margin of trade, 
under the introduction of a polynomial in the predicted number of traded varieties from 
the first stage estimation as a proxy for the fraction of exporting firms (possibly zero). 
In both stages, they employ the PPML estimation technique in order to further control 
for the heteroscedasticity in trade data. Also, the use of PPML enables them to include 
zero trade values per variety in the second stage and thus to take care of the selection 
biases.11 
We follow this method proposed by Flam and Nordstrom (2011). We need to 
carefully choose instrumental variables in the first stage estimation. From the theoretical 
point of view, those variables should be associated with fixed trade costs such as 
regulation in trading (Helpman et al., 2008). In light of this, we use the sum of 
importer’s and exporter’s fragility indices. The Fragility Index, which is prepared by the 
Center for Systemic Peace12, scores each country on both effectiveness and legitimacy 
in four performance dimensions: security, political, economic, and social. It ranges from 
0 (“no fragility”) to 25 (“extreme fragility”). A country’s fragility is closely associated 
with its state capacity to manage conflict; make and implement public policy; and 
deliver essential services and its systemic resilience in maintaining system coherence, 
cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to challenges and crises, and 
continuing progressive development. Thus, this variable will be well related to fixed 
trade costs and thus serve as good instruments. 
The results for the estimation on extensive margin and intensive margin are 
reported in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. There are four points to be noteworthy. First, 
coefficients for the usual gravity variables mostly have expected signs in both extensive 
and intensive margins. Moreover, as is consistent with the findings in the previous 
studies, estimates for the extensive margin are uniformly smaller in value than estimates 
for the intensive margin. Second, the simple RTA dummy has positively significant 
coefficients in both margins. Thus, the conclusion of RTAs increases both the number of 
traded varieties (15%) and the trade values per variety (180%), though the latter 
                                                 
11 With this method, Flam and Nordstrom (2011) find that the firm heterogeneity and selection 
biases are small whereas the heteroscedasticity bias is large. 
12 http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
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magnitude may be too high. Third, as is consistent with the finding in Liu (2009), WTO 
membership increases both margins significantly, though again the impacts on intensive 
margin are too high. Fourth, as expected, the state fragility in trading pairs, which is 
used as a proxy for fixed trade costs, significantly decreases the number of traded 
varieties.  
 
===   Tables 6 & 7   === 
 
     The results for the decomposed RTA variables are as follows. First, the 
coefficients for bilateral tariff rates are insignificant in extensive margin but 
significantly negative in intensive margin. These results may be consistent with the 
finding in Debaere and Mostashari (2010) that tariff reduction has small impacts on 
extensive margin. Second, contrary to the results in Tables 2 and 3, the coefficients for 
dispute settlement are estimated to be significantly positive in both margins, after 
controlling for the firm heterogeneity (a polynomial in the predicted number of traded 
varieties). In other words, this result may indicate that omitting firm heterogeneity 
yields biases in the estimators. Third, the coefficient for intellectual property is 
estimated to be insignificant in the extensive margin. Thus, the provision on intellectual 
property encourages existing exporters to export more rather than facilitating entry of 
new firms into export markets. Last, like in the case of trade values, the provision on 
competition policy has the largest impacts on both margins, following the provision on 
government procurement. This seems to make sense. The aim of the competition policy 
is to ensure that anticompetitive behavior is curbed. This typically encourages entries of 
new firms, domestic or foreign. Similarly, by having a provision on government 
procurement, it is facilitating trades in goods that were not realized in the past, since 
procurement markets were highly protected in the past. By opening up this large 
protected market for trade can induce more goods to be traded. Thus, both of these 
provisions would have positive impacts on extensive and intensive margins. 
 Relative to intensive margin, our results on extensive margins are relatively 
smaller. There are two reasons for this. One is that simply there is little scope left for 
expansion of trade when measured in a number of varieties that are traded among 
countries because of the past success through WTO and other agreements. If that is the 
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case, then it is critical for RTA to have provisions that would go beyond WTO to open 
up sectors that were highly protected in the past. A provision on government 
procurement seems to be one area that is successful in doing so from our analysis. 
Secondly, our analysis is static. If taken a dynamic view as in Besedes and Prusa (2011), 
these new entrants/commodities would continuously be benefitted from the RTA 
(especially given the results on the larger impacts detected from the lagged RTA 
specification). Thus, having these provisions, especially competition policy and 
government procurement can slowly but surely broaden and solidify the supports for 
RTAs for the existing and new exporters. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
     The scope of recent regional trade agreements (RTAs) is becoming much wider in 
terms of including several provisions such as competition policy or intellectual property. 
This paper empirically examines how much each provision in RTAs increases trade 
values among RTA member countries. In order to do so, we estimate the gravity 
equation with the PPML estimation technique with more disaggregated indicators for 
each RTA that is in force. As a result, we find that the provision on competition policy 
has the largest impacts on expanding trade, following that of government procurement. 
Our further analysis reveals that the more significant roles of these two provisions can 
be also observed in the impacts on the intensive and extensive margins. These results 
suggest that it is important to include the provisions of competition policy and 
government procurement not only for maximizing trade creation effects of RTAs but 
also for widening the political support for concluding RTAs. 
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Appendix A. List of RTAs in ESCAP Region (111) 
ACFTA, AJCEPA, ANZCERTA, APTA, ARMENIA-EU, ARMENIA-KAZAKHSTAN, 
ARMENIA-MOLDOVA, ARMENIA-RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ARMENIA-TURKMENISTAN, 
ARMENIA-UKRAINE, ASEAN, AUSTRALIA-CHILE, AUSTRALIA-THAILAND, 
AUSTRALIA-US, BHUTAN-INDIA, BIMSTEC, CHINA-CHILE, CHINA-HONG KONG, 
CHINA-MACAO, CHINA-PAKISTAN, CHINA-PAKISTAN-SERVICES, CHINA-SINGAPORE, 
CHINA-THAILAND, CISFTA, ECOTA, EFTA-KOREA, EFTA-SINGAPORE, EurAsEC, 
GEORGIA-ARMENIA, GEORGIA-AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA-KAZAKHSTAN, 
GEORGIA-RUSSIAN FEDERATION, GEORGIA-TURKEY, GEORGIA-TURKMENISTAN, 
GEORGIA-UKRAINE, GSTP, GUAM, INDIA-AFGHANISTAN, INDIA-BANGLADESH, 
INDIA-CHILE, INDIA-GCC, INDIA-MERCOSUR, INDIA-NEPAL, INDIA-SINGAPORE, 
INDIA-SRI LANKA, INDIA-THAILAND, JAPAN-BRUNEI, JAPAN-CHILE, 
JAPAN-INDONESIA, JAPAN-MALAYSIA, JAPAN-MEXICO, JAPAN-PHILIPPINES, 
JAPAN-SINGAPORE, JAPAN-SWITZERLAND, JAPAN-THAILAND, JAPAN-VIET NAM, 
KAZAKHSTAN-UZBEKISTAN, KOREA-CHILE, KOREA-SINGAPORE, 
KYRGYZSTAN-ARMENIA, KYRGYZSTAN-KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN-MOLDOVA, 
KYRGYZSTAN-RUSSIAN FEDERATION, KYRGYZSTAN-UKRAINE, 
KYRGYZSTAN-UZBEKISTAN, LAO, PDR-THAILAND, MALAYSIA-PAKISTAN, 
MALAYSIA-UNITED STATES, MOLDOVA-UZBEKISTAN, MSG, NAFTA, NEW 
ZEALAND-CHINA, NEW ZEALAND-SINGAPORE, NEW ZEALAND-THAILAND, 
PAKISTAN-IRAN, PAKISTAN-MAURITIUS, PAKISTAN-SRI LANKA, PANAMA-SINGAPORE, 
PATCRA, PICTA, SAFTA, SINGAPORE-AUSTRALIA, SINGAPORE-JORDAN, 
SINGAPORE-PERU, SPARTECA, THAILAND-BAHRAIN, TRANS-PACIFIC SEP, 
TURKEY-ALBANIA, TURKEY-BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, TURKEY-CROATIA, 
TURKEY-EC, TURKEY-EFTA, TURKEY-EGYPT, TURKEY-FYROM, TURKEY-ISRAEL, 
TURKEY-MOROCCO, TURKEY-PALESTINE, TURKEY-SYRIA, TURKEY-TUNISIA, 
UKRAINE-AZERBIJAN, UKRAINE-KAZAKHSTAN, UKRAINE-RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
UKRAINE-TAJIKISTAN, UKRAINE-TURKMENISTAN, UKRAINE-UZBEKISTAN, UNITED 
STATES-AFGHANISTAN, UNITED STATES-ASEAN, UNITED STATES-LAO PDR, UNITED 
STATES-SINGAPORE, UNITED STATES-VIET NAM, US-CA TIFA 
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Appendix B. List of Sample Countries 
 
 
  
Area Country Area Country
Africa Algeria Asia Pakistan
Africa Morocco Asia Philippines
Africa Mozambique Asia Russian Federation
Africa Nigeria Asia Saudi Arabia
Africa Sudan Asia Singapore
Africa Tanzania, United Rep. of Asia Sri Lanka
Africa Tunisia Asia Thailand
Africa Zimbabwe Europe Albania
America Argentina Europe Austria
America Bolivia Europe Belarus
America Brazil Europe Belgium and Luxembourg
America Chile Europe Bosnia and Herzegovina
America Ecuador Europe Bulgaria
America Mexico Europe Croatia
America Nicaragua Europe Cyprus
America Paraguay Europe Czech Republic
America Peru Europe Finland
America Trinidad and Tobago Europe France
America United States of America Europe Germany
America Uruguay Europe Greece
America Venezuela Europe Hungary
Asia Afghanistan Europe Ireland
Asia Armenia Europe Latvia
Asia Azerbaijan Europe Macedonia (the former Yugoslav Rep. of)
Asia Bhutan Europe Moldova, Rep.of
Asia China Europe Netherlands
Asia India Europe Portugal
Asia Indonesia Europe Romania
Asia Israel Europe Sweden
Asia Japan Europe Switzerland
Asia Jordan Europe Turkey
Asia Kazakstan Europe Ukraine
Asia Korea Europe United Kingdom
Asia Kyrgyzstan Pacific Australia
Asia Malaysia Pacific Fiji
Asia Nepal Pacific New Zealand
Asia Oman
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Table 1. Table of Contents in NAFTA 
PART ONE: GENERAL PART
Chapter One Objectives
Chapter Two General Definitions
PART TWO: TRADE IN GOODS 
Chapter Three National Treatment and Market Access for Goods
Chapter Four Rules of Origin
Chapter Five Customs Procedures
Chapter Six Energy and Basic Petrochemicals
Chapter Seven Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Chapter Eight Emergency Action
PART THREE: TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 
Chapter Nine Standards-Related Measures
PART FOUR: GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
Chapter Ten Government Procurement
PART FIVE: INVESTMENT, SERVICES AND RELATED MATTERS 
Chapter Eleven Investment
Chapter Twelve Cross-Border Trade in Services
Chapter Thirteen Telecommunications
Chapter Fourteen Financial Services
Chapter Fifteen Competition Policy, Monopolies and State Enterprises
Chapter Sixteen Temporary Entry for Business Persons
PART SIX: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Chapter Seventeen Intellectual Property
PART SEVEN: ADMINISTRATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Chapter Eighteen Publication, Notification and Administration of Laws
Chapter Nineteen
Chapter Twenty
PART EIGHT: OTHER PROVISIONS 
Chapter Twenty-One Exceptions
Chapter Twenty-Two Final Provisions
ANNEXES
Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement 
Procedures
Review and Dispute Settlement in 
Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Matters
 
Source: NAFTA Secretariat Website (http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343) 
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Table 2. Existence of Provisions in Sample RTAs 
Government Competition Intellectual Dispute Number Percent
Procurement Policy Property Settlement
YES 40 36
YES 46 42
YES 53 48
YES 67 60
YES YES YES YES 27 24
YES YES YES NO 4 4
YES YES NO YES 4 4
YES NO YES YES 3 3
NO YES YES YES 2 2
YES YES NO NO 0 0
YES NO YES NO 1 1
YES NO NO YES 1 1
NO YES YES NO 3 3
NO YES NO YES 5 5
NO NO YES YES 8 7
NO NO NO YES 17 15
NO NO YES NO 5 5
NO YES NO NO 1 1
YES NO NO NO 0 0
NO NO NO NO 30 27  
Source: Asia - Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements Database (UN ESCAP) 
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Table 3. PPML Estimation for Gravity Equations 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Distance -0.613*** -0.670*** -0.615*** -0.623*** -0.596*** -0.591***
[0.042] [0.047] [0.043] [0.043] [0.044] [0.045]
Language 0.326*** 0.224** 0.207* 0.198* 0.199* 0.252**
[0.109] [0.101] [0.107] [0.105] [0.112] [0.113]
Contingency 0.247* 0.16 0.168 0.153 0.269** 0.268*
[0.129] [0.126] [0.132] [0.132] [0.135] [0.137]
Colony 0.137 0.201* 0.219* 0.216* 0.218 0.184
[0.134] [0.111] [0.120] [0.119] [0.133] [0.129]
RTA 0.206**
[0.084]
Tariff -2.487** -2.061** -1.885** -2.683** -2.983**
[1.056] [0.924] [0.866] [1.192] [1.275]
Government -0.229 0.490***
[0.169] [0.103]
Competition 1.049*** 0.553***
[0.194] [0.096]
Intellectual -0.187 0.196**
[0.138] [0.089]
Dispute -0.241* 0.12
[0.124] [0.086]
Number of Observations 2,862 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840
R-squared 0.9184 0.9433 0.9337 0.9372 0.9253 0.9242
Pseudo log-likelihood -4.4E+11 -3.8E+11 -4.1E+11 -4.0E+11 -4.3E+11 -4.3E+11  
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In parenthesis is a semi-robust 
standard error. 
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Table 4. Robustness Checks: Including WTO Dummy Variable 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Distance -0.619*** -0.679*** -0.623*** -0.631*** -0.604*** -0.601***
[0.042] [0.046] [0.042] [0.043] [0.044] [0.044]
Language 0.304*** 0.198** 0.201* 0.191* 0.184* 0.244**
[0.107] [0.099] [0.106] [0.104] [0.110] [0.111]
Contingency 0.230* 0.148 0.15 0.134 0.243* 0.248*
[0.127] [0.122] [0.129] [0.129] [0.130] [0.133]
Colony 0.058 0.145 0.145 0.144 0.14 0.106
[0.119] [0.106] [0.110] [0.109] [0.121] [0.117]
RTA 0.185**
[0.082]
Tariff -1.971** -1.590* -1.408* -2.015* -2.467**
[0.972] [0.875] [0.817] [1.064] [1.205]
Government -0.246 0.471***
[0.169] [0.102]
Competition 1.023*** 0.537***
[0.195] [0.095]
Intellectual -0.106 0.218**
[0.133] [0.088]
Dispute -0.281** 0.108
[0.122] [0.084]
WTO 1.632*** 1.214*** 1.263*** 1.244*** 1.535*** 1.406***
[0.343] [0.347] [0.326] [0.324] [0.362] [0.348]
Number of Observations 2,862 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840
R-squared 0.9214 0.9444 0.9350 0.9385 0.9271 0.9259
Pseudo log-likelihood -4.3E+11 -3.8E+11 -4.0E+11 -3.9E+11 -4.2E+11 -4.2E+11  
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In parenthesis is a semi-robust 
standard error. 
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Table 5. Robustness Checks: 5-year Lagged Effects of Provision 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Distance -0.613*** -0.613*** -0.564*** -0.569***
[0.042] [0.042] [0.044] [0.044]
Language 0.214** 0.213** 0.231** 0.311***
[0.105] [0.105] [0.103] [0.103]
Contingency 0.099 0.094 0.069 0.148
[0.124] [0.123] [0.131] [0.135]
Colony 0.155 0.156 0.225* 0.121
[0.107] [0.107] [0.121] [0.116]
Tariff -1.308 -1.255 -1.859* -2.447**
[0.863] [0.852] [1.036] [1.208]
Government 0.607***
[0.125]
Competition 0.627***
[0.125]
Intellectual 0.537***
[0.133]
Dispute 0.278***
[0.097]
WTO 1.214*** 1.214*** 1.553*** 1.287***
[0.316] [0.315] [0.359] [0.329]
Number of Observations 2,836 2,836 2,836 2,836
R-squared 0.9335 0.9335 0.9377 0.9311
Pseudo log-likelihood -4.0E+11 -4.0E+11 -4.1E+11 -4.2E+11  
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In parenthesis is a semi-robust 
standard error. Each dummy variable of provisions is five-year lagged. 
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Table 6. PPML Estimation for Gravity Equations: Extensive Margin 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Distance -0.384*** -0.391*** -0.375*** -0.373*** -0.388*** -0.379***
[0.029] [0.032] [0.031] [0.031] [0.033] [0.031]
Language 0.200*** 0.175*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.169*** 0.175***
[0.051] [0.048] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.052]
Contingency 0.006 -0.043 -0.032 -0.034 -0.01 -0.018
[0.099] [0.097] [0.096] [0.095] [0.096] [0.098]
Colony 0.305*** 0.292*** 0.322*** 0.314*** 0.333*** 0.328***
[0.079] [0.076] [0.077] [0.076] [0.081] [0.080]
RTA 0.140***
[0.031]
Tariff -1.803 -1.508 -1.261 -2.213 -2.124
[1.345] [1.262] [1.215] [1.525] [1.401]
Government -0.115 0.215***
[0.114] [0.051]
Competition 0.478*** 0.268***
[0.111] [0.049]
Intellectual -0.168** 0.037
[0.079] [0.054]
Dispute -0.008 0.075**
[0.051] [0.037]
WTO 0.808*** 0.637*** 0.716*** 0.705*** 0.791*** 0.752***
[0.190] [0.191] [0.192] [0.190] [0.203] [0.197]
Fragility -0.061 -0.073* -0.075** -0.070* -0.081** -0.075*
[0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.037] [0.038] [0.039]
Number of Observations 2,862 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840
R-squared 0.8724 0.8784 0.8767 0.8781 0.8749 0.8734
Pseudo log-likelihood -1.3E+05 -1.2E+05 -1.3E+05 -1.3E+05 -1.3E+05 -1.3E+05  
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In parenthesis is a semi-robust 
standard error. 
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Table 7. PPML Estimation for Gravity Equations: Intensive Margin 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Distance -2.418*** -2.113*** -2.042*** -2.174*** -1.921*** -2.005***
[0.767] [0.652] [0.633] [0.669] [0.589] [0.641]
Language 0.985*** 0.607** 0.584** 0.632** 0.502** 0.641**
[0.369] [0.280] [0.267] [0.278] [0.254] [0.285]
Contingency 0.417** 0.191 0.222 0.165 0.275 0.292*
[0.180] [0.154] [0.176] [0.183] [0.173] [0.174]
Colony 1.592** 1.429*** 1.422** 1.502** 1.447*** 1.402**
[0.665] [0.529] [0.592] [0.609] [0.553] [0.602]
RTA 1.031***
[0.289]
Tariff -7.854*** -6.545** -5.894** -8.535** -8.893***
[2.940] [2.525] [2.303] [3.294] [3.425]
Government -1.082*** 1.156***
[0.382] [0.383]
Competition 2.694*** 1.681***
[0.859] [0.495]
Intellectual -0.202 0.656***
[0.346] [0.160]
Dispute -0.197 0.452***
[0.167] [0.172]
WTO 5.165*** 3.752*** 4.032*** 4.204*** 4.114*** 4.110***
[1.747] [1.266] [1.459] [1.490] [1.439] [1.511]
Predicted number of varieties -4.080** -3.092* -3.158* -3.460* -2.698* -2.989*
[1.975] [1.673] [1.686] [1.791] [1.538] [1.695]
Square of predicted number -0.271*** -0.309*** -0.266*** -0.291*** -0.293*** -0.271***
[0.068] [0.072] [0.076] [0.073] [0.074] [0.076]
Cube of predicted numer 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of Observations 2,862 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,840
R-squared 0.8989 0.8992 0.8956 0.8953 0.8998 0.8969
Pseudo log-likelihood -1.1E+09 -1.1E+09 -1.1E+09 -1.1E+09 -1.1E+09 -1.1E+09  
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In parenthesis is a semi-robust 
standard error. 
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Figure 1. Number of RTAs in ESCAP Region 
 
Source: Asia - Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements Database (UN ESCAP) 
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